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The debate on criminal corporate liability in the United 
States might benefit from a comparative perspective: How have 
other countries treated the criminal liability of corporate entities? 
This benefit might be enhanced by focusing on a country with a 
similar legal heritage to the United States—a country with a 
common law legal system inherited from the British. And, it 
would help if that country were concurrently examining the issue 
of criminal corporate liability. Interesting questions might in-
clude: What issues dominate the debate? How are issues of 
punishment, reparations, and rehabilitation handled? Is a legisla-
tive approach contemplated? The purpose of this Article is to offer 
one such alternate perspective, the Irish perspective.  
At the end of 2010, the Irish Minister for Justice and Law Re-
form Dermot Ahern announced plans for the government to adopt 
legislation placing the crime of corporate manslaughter on a stat-
utory foundation, relying in part on previous research by the Irish 
Law Reform Commission (LRC).1 This paper synopsizes an im-
portant research document by the LRC on the elements of a 
legislative approach to corporate manslaughter.2 By reviewing the 
  
 * © 2011, Bruce Carolan. All rights reserved. Head of Department of Law, Dublin 
Institute of Technology, Dublin, Ireland. Thank you to Professor Ellen Podgor of Stetson 
University College of Law for the invitation to participate in the panel on Corporate Crim-
inal Liability at the Southeastern Association of Law Schools, and to my fellow panelists 
for their comments. Thanks also to Dr. Mary Rogan of the Dublin Institute of Technology 
for her review of my written comments. Any mistakes are my own. 
 1. See Irishtimes.com, Corporate Manslaughter Bill Planned, http://www.irishtimes 
.com/newspaper/breaking/2010/1229/breaking12.html (accessed Apr. 20, 2011) (explaining 
that “new regulations . . . would make companies and senior managers criminally liable for 
the death of employees in the workplace”). 
 2. L. Reform Comm’n, Report on Corporate Killing (LRC 77-2005) (available  
at http://www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/Reports/Report%20Corporate%20Killing.pdf) (ac-
cessed Oct. 1, 2011). 
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Irish suggestions, my hope is to prompt discussion and debate on 
issues facing the United States on the question of corporate crim-
inal liability. 
The comparative perspective suggests, preliminarily, that the 
American debate could widen and deepen if the focus included 
more consideration of the remedies available under a criminal 
scheme to address corporate criminal wrongdoing. Much of the 
debate in the United States and in the symposium from which 
this paper arises focuses on ethical issues of accountability—in 
particular, whether it is ethically sound to impose penalties on 
“innocent” parties for wrongdoing committed by a large, corporate 
entity.3 There also is debate over the efficacy of criminal penalties 
for corporate wrongdoing, with a notable absence of incarceration 
as a viable penalty.4 The Irish discussion, however, has not cen-
tered on the dual issues of accountability and financial penalties. 
Instead, the Irish debate includes the possibility of a range of 
remedies as criminal penalties for corporate wrongdoing.5 Dis-
cussing the possible remedies in some sense sidesteps the issues 
of individual accountability and efficacy of punitive measures to 
address corporate wrongdoing. These issues should be raised and 
discussed in more detail in the United States debate. 
II. VARYING APPROACHES TO LIABILITY FOR  
CORPORATE WRONGDOING 
A. The Irish Situation 
Ireland has been reviewing its approach to criminalizing cor-
porate killing for a number of years.6 In Ireland, a corporation 
may be held criminally liable for wrongdoing, even when intent is 
an element of the crime.7 Irish law has not, however, adopted a 
  
 3. S.E. Ass’n of L. Schs., Annual Meeting 2010 Update 16 (available  
at http://sealslawschools.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/SEALSProgramMay24Draft2010 
.pdf) (accessed Oct. 1, 2011). 
 4. Id.  
 5. See Irishtimes.com, supra n. 1 (discussing several options for penalties and reme-
dies for corporate manslaughter).  
 6. L. Reform Comm’n, Criminal Law (Completed Projects) § 3.10, http://www 
.lawreform.ie/welcome/criminal-law-completed-projects.251.html (accessed July 30, 2011). 
 7. See Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001 pt. 9 s. 58 (available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/pdf/2001/en.act.2001.0050.pdf) (accessed Oct. 1, 2011) 
(providing for criminal liability for a corporate body, under the Act, in cases involving the 
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single, stable approach to the crime of corporate manslaughter.8 
To date, as noted by the LRC, “[T]here has never been a prosecu-
tion of a corporate entity for manslaughter in Ireland.”9 But, 
prosecution for corporate manslaughter is possible in Ireland, 
and, in the absence of a statutory definition, liability would be 
determined by Irish courts applying the Irish common law.10 Irish 
common law, in turn, relies heavily on British common law.11 
Even though the United Kingdom has adopted legislation dealing 
with corporate manslaughter,12 the Irish courts would turn to pre-
existing British common law in defining the crime of corporate 
manslaughter in an Irish context.13 
Therein lies the rub. British courts apply several different 
approaches to the question of attributing wrongdoing to a corpo-
rate entity.14 An Irish court could thus adopt one of several 
approaches on the issue of corporate manslaughter. 
This instability in corporate criminal liability is problematic. 
The LRC has set out to resolve the problem.15 In two major re-
ports, the LRC has suggested a legislative solution to the 
problem.16 While Ireland has not yet adopted legislation incorpo-
rating the LRC’s recommendations, Minister Ahern has 
recommended that it do so.17 To more fully appreciate the ap-
  
“consent or connivance . . . [or] neglect” of a corporate officer); Competition Act, 2002 pt. 1 
s. 3 (available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/pdf/2002/en.act.2002.0014.pdf) (accessed 
Oct. 1, 2011) (defining an “undertaking” capable of prosecution under the Act to include a 
“body corporate”); Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2001 pt. 9 (available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/pdf/2001/en.act.2001.0027.pdf) (accessed Oct. 1, 2011) (uti-
lizing language similar to that of the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act of 
2001 in imposing corporate liability in instances of public corruption); see also L. Reform 
Comm’n, Consultation Paper on Corporate Killing (LRC CP 26-2003) 19–26 (available at 
http://www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/consultation%20papers/cpCorporate%20Killing.pdf) 
(accessed Oct. 1, 2011) (offering an overview on the state of the law regarding corporate 
criminal liability in Ireland). 
 8. See generally L. Reform Comm’n, supra n. 2. 
 9. Id. at 4. 
 10. Id. at 4–5. 
 11. Id.; L. Reform Comm’n, supra n. 7, at 24–25. 
 12. Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 (available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110201125714/http://legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/ 
2007/19/pdfs/ukpga_20070019_en.pdf) (accessed Oct. 1, 2011). 
 13. L. Reform Comm’n, supra n. 2 at 4–5. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 3–7. 
 16. Id. at 42–43; L. Reform Comm’n, supra n. 7, at 166.  
 17. Irishtimes.com, supra n. 1. A bill on corporate manslaughter had previously been 
introduced as a private members bill, based on the LRC recommendations, but did not 
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proach suggested by the LRC, it is useful to review the current, 
likely common law approach to an Irish prosecution for corporate 
manslaughter. As noted above, this requires consideration of the 
British approach to criminal liability for corporate wrongdoing, 
particularly as the British law applied before the 2007 adoption of 
the United Kingdom’s Corporate Manslaughter Act.18 
B. The British Approach to Corporate Manslaughter 
In the United Kingdom, before the Corporate Manslaughter 
Act’s 2007 adoption, the courts used various tests to assign crimi-
nal liability for corporate wrongdoing.19 Perhaps the leading 
approach is the “Identification Doctrine,” which was established 
in Tesco Supermarkets Limited v. Nattrass,20 a prosecution 
brought against Tesco Supermarkets for a criminal violation of 
the British Trade Description Act.21 The supermarket had adver-
tised a sales price for a certain cleaning liquid.22 A poster in the 
store advertised the sale.23 When supplies ran out, a manager re-
stocked the empty shelves with a higher-priced item but failed to 
remove the poster advertising the lower price.24 A customer was 
overcharged, and a criminal prosecution was brought.25 
The company defended with the argument that the act of 
“another person”—the branch manager—was responsible for the 
wrongdoing.26 The House of Lords, in a number of opinions (each 
of which might produce a different result if applied), echoed an 
earlier opinion by Lord Denning, in which he analogized a corpo-
rate entity to a human body: 
A company may in many ways be likened to a human body. 
It has a brain and nerve centre which controls what it does. 
  
progress. Id.  
 18. L. Reform Comm’n, supra n. 7, at 4–5. 
 19. Id. 
 20. [1972] A.C. 153 (HL).  
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 156. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 168. 
 26. Id. The term “another person” is used to mean any individual outside the brain or 
“nerve centre” of the corporation. Id. at 171, 177–178. It is an idea used as a defense to the 
imposition of corporate liability. Id. at 177–178. 
File: Carolan.Galley.Final.docx Created on: 12/5/2011 4:31:00 PM Last Printed: 12/5/2011 4:41:00 PM 
2011] Criminalizing Corporate Killing: The Irish Approach 161 
It also has hands which hold the tools and act in accordance 
with directions from the centre. Some of the people in the 
company are mere servants and agents who are nothing 
more than hands to do the work and cannot be said to repre-
sent the mind or will. Others are directors and managers 
who represent the directing mind and will of the company, 
and control what it does. The state of mind of these manag-
ers is the state of mind of the company and is treated by the 
law as such.27 
Using H.L. Bolton, the Lords in Tesco generally agreed that 
the branch manager responsible for the misadvertising was too 
low in the corporate hierarchy (i.e., was the “hands” rather than 
the “brain or nerve centre”) for the company to be held liable for 
the violation.28 The branch manager’s acts were not the result of 
controlling action by the company’s nerve centre.29 The manager 
was not the company, but “another person” who broke the chain 
necessary for corporate liability.30 
There was considerable dispute among the Lords about who 
might cause the corporation to be liable.31 Was it limited to the 
board of directors, managing director, and other superior officers? 
Was it the chief operating officer or other person in actual control 
of the company’s day-to-day operation? Was it those identified in 
the controlling documents as having high-level responsibilities? 
Whatever the differences, there was clear agreement that corpo-
rate liability only resulted, if at all, from the acts of those at the 
highest levels of corporate governance.32 
Other British judicial opinions adopt a different approach to 
assigning liability to a company based on the actions of individual 
employees.33 Thus, there is not one definitive approach to criminal 
  
 27. Id. at 171 (quoting H.L. Bolton (Eng’g) Co. Ltd. v. T.J. Graham & Sons Ltd., [1957] 
1 Q.B. 159, 172).  
 28. Id. at 171, 180–181. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 181. 
 31. Id. at 187. 
 32. Id. 
 33. E.g. Meridian Global Funds Mgt. Asia Ltd. v. Sec. Comm’n, [1995] 2 A.C. 500, 502 
(holding that the question of whether an individual director’s acts will be attributed to the 
company is determined by looking first to the company’s constitution and laws and then to 
general rules of agency); Regina v. British Steel Plc., [1995] ICR 586 (holding that an em-
ployer cannot escape liability for exposing independent contractors to risk caused by 
employees simply by showing that the company’s “directing mind” took all reasonable care 
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liability for corporate wrongdoing under British common law. Ac-
cordingly, for all practical purposes, Ireland—with its reliance on 
the British common law in determining criminal liability for cor-
porate manslaughter—shares the same uncertainty of approach. 
C. The Irish Problem 
There is no definitive common law approach to corporate 
manslaughter in Ireland. In a case alleging corporate manslaugh-
ter, an Irish court would look to decisions of the British courts in 
the absence of Irish legislation.34 But, as noted above, British cas-
es are themselves uncertain as to the proper standards for 
liability for corporate wrongdoing.35 Each case’s outcome would 
depend upon the particular factual context.36 There is an unre-
ported Irish decision, in which the owner and operator of an 
unsafe fairground ride was convicted of gross negligence man-
slaughter,37 but it is unlikely that this decision would provide 
much guidance in deciding the criminal liability of a large corpo-
ration. An Irish court would be free to cite to and rely on any of 
the foregoing British cases as persuasive authority in deciding 
corporate criminal liability for manslaughter.38 This presents an 
unstable environment in which to operate business, and also 
threatens unequal results for society in prosecutions for criminal 
liability for corporate killing. 
  
to discharge its duty); Dir. Gen. of Fair Trading v. Pioneer Concrete, [1995] ICR 25, 25–26 
(holding the company in contempt of court because employees ignored prohibition against 
making agreements, even though prohibition was followed at senior level). 
 34. L. Reform Comm’n, supra n. 2, at 4–5. 
 35. See supra n. 33 (listing various British cases). 
 36. L. Reform Comm’n, supra n. 2, at 5. 
 37. See L. Reform Comm’n, Homicide: Murder and Involuntary Manslaughter 85– 
86 (LRC 87-2008) http://www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/Reports/rMurderandInvoluntaryMS 
.pdf (accessed July 30, 2011) (reporting on the decision in The People (DPP) v. Cullagh 
(1998) in which the owner of a chairoplane ride at a funfair that malfunctioned and killed 
a rider was found guilty of gross negligence manslaughter for failing to inspect and make 
repairs to the twenty-year-old ride).  
 38. See supra n. 33 (citing British cases). 
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III. THE IRISH SOLUTION 
A. Corporate Liability 
The LRC recommends that “as the current [common] law of 
corporate liability for manslaughter does not provide a clear basis 
for constructing liability, a new basis, contained in legislative 
form, is necessary.”39 The LRC sets out to address the various 
complexities that arise when using legislation to stabilize crimi-
nal liability for corporate killing.40 
The LRC notes certain issues that must be addressed in any 
legislative solution. The first issue is the “paradox of size.”41 This 
means, the smaller the corporate entity, the more likely it is that 
an individual’s acts can be ascribed to the company.42 This makes 
it more likely that a larger company will escape liability due to a 
large, complex chain of command. For example, in the English 
case of R. v. Kite and OLL Limited,43 the acts of the managing 
director of a one-man firm led directly to the company’s conviction 
for manslaughter.44 On the other hand, in R. v. P & O European 
Ferries (Dover) Limited,45 an official inquiry into the deaths sur-
rounding the sinking of a passenger ferry found deficiencies 
throughout the company’s operation, yet the company escaped 
liability for corporate manslaughter because no individual could 
be found liable for manslaughter.46 
Thus, the LRC believes that “a statutory formulation for cor-
porate killing should take account of different sizes of corporate 
entities to which the offence would apply.”47 This issue could be 
given added prominence in the United States debate, to better 
inform the accountability issue in corporate criminal liability. 
The LRC notes that an approach to corporate killing that fo-
cuses on the criminal law runs the risk of not being as sufficiently 
  
 39. L. Reform Comm’n, supra n. 2, at 5. 
 40. Id.  
 41. Id. at 5–6. 
 42. Id. at 6. 
 43. Winchester Crown Court, 8 December 1994; The Independent 9 December 1994 
(cited by L. Reform Comm’n, supra n. 2, at 6). 
 44. L. Reform Comm’n, supra n. 2, at 6 (citing Kite, Winchester Crown Court, 8 De-
cember 1994; The Independent 9 December 1994). 
 45. [1991] 93 Cr App R 72 (cited by L. Reform Comm’n, supra n. 2, at 6). 
 46. Id. 
 47. L. Reform Comm’n, supra n. 2, at 7. 
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proactive as other, civil approaches.48 For example, an agency 
charged with inspecting, reporting, and possibly fining companies 
for unsafe conditions might be more effective than the after-the-
fact approach of punishing corporate killing through the criminal 
law.49 Nevertheless, on the basis of deterrence, public censure, 
and consistency, the LRC is of the view that “criminal liability for 
manslaughter is an appropriate means of dealing with death 
caused by corporate wrongdoing.”50 As will become apparent, by 
providing greater flexibility in the penalties available to punish 
this corporate crime, the proposed approach addresses some of the 
concerns over the effectiveness of criminally prosecuting corpora-
tions. 
The LRC also recognizes the difficulty of establishing the 
mental element of a crime when a corporation is the defendant, 
even though intent is recognized as something a corporation can 
possess.51 For example, it is highly doubtful that a corporation can 
be guilty of murder in Ireland.52 The LRC identifies this difficulty 
of proving intent as an issue to be addressed in formulating pro-
posed legislation.53 Still, this does not bar prosecution of a 
corporation for manslaughter, because there are two categories of 
manslaughter recognized in Irish law: voluntary and involun-
tary.54 Voluntary manslaughter requires intent, as it amounts to 
an intentional killing with extenuating circumstances.55  
Involuntary manslaughter is divided into two categories: 
“manslaughter by a criminal and dangerous act and manslaugh-
ter by gross negligence.”56 The LRC recommends that the most 
appropriate category for criminal liability for corporate killing is 
involuntary manslaughter by gross negligence,57 and then identi-
fies four elements of gross-negligence manslaughter: (1) the 
accused was, by ordinary objective standards, negligent; (2) the 
  
 48. Id. at 10.  
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. at 11. 
 51. Id. at 16 (describing an English case in which a corporation was found guilty of 
conspiring to defraud because “the intent of the managing director could be attributed to 
the defendant company”). 
 52. Id. at 15. 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
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negligence caused the death of the victim; (3) the negligence was 
of a very high degree; and (4) the negligence involved a high de-
gree of risk or likelihood of substantial personal injury to others.58 
B. Individual Liability 
The issues of individual liability and corporate liability are 
intertwined.59 Apart from the previous discussion of the “paradox 
of size,” the issue of corporate liability depends upon the view of 
the company as the sum of its parts (atomized view) or as an enti-
ty in itself (organic view).60 A completely atomized view of the 
company might remove all likelihood of corporate liability for 
manslaughter, as the acts of individuals might not be ascribed to 
the company.61  
The LRC “considers that a well[-]formulated scheme of corpo-
rate culpability would look separately at the liability of the 
corporate entity and the individuals within it.”62 The LRC then 
concludes:  
[C]orporate liability for manslaughter [should] be based on a 
test of gross negligence, formulated around a breach of duty. 
While the test will be applied to the entity as a whole, regard 
should be had to the wrongdoing of individuals within the 
entity when assessing whether the corporate entity has 
breached its duty.63 
IV. CONSTRUCTION OF CORPORATE LIABILITY 
A. Introduction 
Using gross negligence manslaughter as the applicable cul-
pability standard largely removes the issue of subjective intent, 
which would be problematic with a corporate defendant, and re-
places it with a more objective standard.64 To define this 
  
 58. Id. (citing The People (Att’y Gen.) v. Dunleavy [1948] IR 95). 
 59. Id. at 65. 
 60. Id. at 27. 
 61. Id. at 28. 
 62. Id. at 39. 
 63. Id. at 40. 
 64. Id. at 47. 
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standard, the LRC has referred to the United States Model Penal 
Code Section 2.02(2)(d), which provides the following elements for 
criminal negligence: 
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element 
of an offense when he should be aware of a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will re-
sult from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and 
degree that the actor’s failure to perceive it, considering the 
nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances 
known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard 
of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor’s 
situation.65  
Employing these criteria and those derived from the Irish 
law, the LRC, as a preliminary matter, “recommends that these 
elements should form the basis of the test of corporate liability for 
manslaughter: (a) [t]he undertaking was negligent; (b) [t]he neg-
ligence was of a sufficiently high degree to be characteri[z]ed as 
‘gross’ and so warrant criminal sanction; and (c) [t]he negligence 
caused the death.”66 
The remainder of this Article will more closely consider as-
pects of these elements and the recommended sanctions for 
corporate manslaughter. 
B. Standard of Culpability 
The proposed Irish legislative standard of liability for corpo-
rate manslaughter is gross negligence.67 The LRC describes gross 
negligence as a crime of capacity rather than of autonomy.68 That 
is, a person is guilty of gross negligence if he or she had the capac-
ity to avoid the harm caused.69 This standard is objective, and it 
avoids an inquiry into the corporation’s mental intent for the 
crime because no autonomous act is needed to prove gross negli-
gence.70 The LRC explains that “[w]hat is at issue is that [a 
  
 65. Id. at 49 (quoting Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(d) (ALI 1985)). 
 66. L. Reform Comm’n, supra n. 2, at 47. 
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. (citing Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law 193–194 (4th ed., Oxford 
U. Press 2003)). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
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corporation] can be said to have the capacity to take the requisite 
level of care to avoid the commission of manslaughter.”71 
While citing The People (Attorney General) v. Dunleavy, the 
LRC describes the elements of gross negligence manslaughter as 
comprising that: 
 the accused was, by ordinary objective standards, 
negligent;  
 the negligence caused the death of the victim;  
 the negligence was of a very high degree; and 
 the negligence involved a high degree of risk or likeli-
hood of substantial personal injury to others.72 
C. First Element: Negligence 
The first element, negligence, requires a finding that the de-
fendant owed the deceased a duty of care.73 Rather than 
comprehensively defining the issue by legislation, the LRC rec-
ommends that “whether [a corporation] owed a deceased a duty of 
care should be established based on existing common law rules 
and statutory duties.”74 The LRC, however, goes on to recommend 
that a “non-exhaustive, indicative list” of duties—such as the duty 
of a landowner, employer, or producer of goods to relevant par-
ties—be included in any statutory scheme.75 Once a duty of care is 
established, it is necessary when determining negligence to con-
sider what standard of care is required.76 For a human person, 
the standard of care is one of the reasonable person.77 This stand-
ard does not easily translate to a corporate defendant.78 The LRC 
“recommends that the standard of care should require the [corpo-
ration] to take all reasonable measures to anticipate and prevent 
  
 71. Id. (citing L. Comm’n of Eng. & Wales, Consultation Paper on Involuntary Man-
slaughter ¶ 5.77 (LAWCOM No. 135 1994)). 
 72. Id. at 48. 
 73. Id. at 50. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 51. 
 76. Id. at 52. 
 77. Id. (citing Dunleavy, [1948] IR at 102). 
 78. Id.  
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risks of death or serious personal harm, having due regard to the 
[corporation’s] size and circumstances.”79  
With regard to the standard of care, the LRC deems it rele-
vant to consider “the way in which the organi[z]ation’s activities 
are managed or organi[z]ed by its high managerial agents,”80 to 
“the regulatory environment in which the undertaking oper-
ates,”81 as well as to “any corporate assurance systems that the 
undertaking subscribes to.”82 It is also important, in the LRC’s 
view, to consider “whether the senior management sought to prof-
it from the breach of duty.”83 The LRC also recommends that a 
court should, when deciding the issue of gross negligence, “drill 
down” into the organization’s management structure, and consid-
er “[t]he allocation of responsibility within the undertaking; [t]he 
procedural decision making rules of the undertaking; [and] [t]he 
policies of the undertaking.”84 The LRC refers to this as the “cor-
porate culture,”85 and also recommends considering “[t]he training 
and supervision of employees by the undertaking [and] [t]he re-
sponse of the undertaking to previous incidents involving a risk of 
death or serious personal harm.”86  
D. Second Element: “Gross” Nature of Negligence 
The second element of the proposed crime of corporate man-
slaughter is gross negligence.87 This must be distinguished from 
ordinary negligence.88 But, it is difficult to define with precision 
when negligence is sufficiently gross to warrant a criminal convic-
tion for corporate manslaughter. The LRC notes the risk of 
circularity in the definition: “[i]f members of the jury ask how 
negligent [a defendant] must have been if they are to convict of 
  
 79. Id. at 53. 
 80. Id. at 55. 
 81. Id. at 56. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. The report also states that the profit motive is not a factor in determining guilt 
or liability, but it may become an issue for sentencing. Id.  
 84. Id. at 57. 
 85. Id. at 56. 
 86. Id. at 57–58. 
 87. Id. at 59. 
 88. Id. at 17. 
File: Carolan.Galley.Final.docx Created on: 12/5/2011 4:31:00 PM Last Printed: 12/5/2011 4:41:00 PM 
2011] Criminalizing Corporate Killing: The Irish Approach 169 
manslaughter, the answer is ‘so negligent as to deserve conviction 
for manslaughter.’”89 
The LRC recommends the approach adopted in Dunleavy90 to 
define gross negligence.91 According to the LRC, “[t]he negligence 
will be characteri[z]ed as ‘gross’ if it: (a) was of a very high degree; 
and (b) involved a significant risk of death or serious personal 
harm.”92  
E. Third Element: Causation 
The third element of corporate manslaughter is causation.93 
The issue posed with respect to causation is the likelihood that a 
corporate defendant may successfully interpose the defense of 
novus actus interveniens.94 That is, a corporation might argue that 
an act of an employee broke the chain of causation for the corpo-
rate offense.95 
For that reason, the LRC suggests “that the corporate acts 
should be ‘a cause’ as opposed to ‘the immediate cause’ of death.”96 
Therefore, the LRC “recommends that the normal rules of causa-
tion should apply to corporate manslaughter.”97  
V. SANCTIONS FOR CORPORATIONS 
A. Introduction 
It is in the areas of sanctions for corporate manslaughter that 
the Irish approach may have the most valuable insights to offer 
for the American debate. The common-sense observations about 
the nature of the corporate defendant and the range of options 
available in imposing sanctions on a corporate defendant deserve 
  
 89. Id. at 59 (quoting Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law 299 (4th ed., 
Oxford U. Press 2003)). 
 90. [1948] I.R. 95, 100 (Ir.). 
 91. See L. Reform Comm’n, supra n. 2, at 60 (recommending that the two factors de-
fined in Dunleavy be adopted to provide guidance to a court in distinguishing gross 
negligence from civil negligence). 
 92. Id.  
 93. Id.  
 94. Id. at 61. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 60 (citing Charleton, McDermott & Bolger, Criminal Law ¶ 7.23 (Butter-
worths 1999)). 
 97. Id. at 62. 
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to be highlighted in consideration of corporate criminal liability 
under United States law.  
The LRC believes that rehabilitation of a corporate offender 
may be more likely than rehabilitation of a human criminal de-
fendant.98 In the case of a corporate defendant, changes to the 
“corporate culture,” or replacement of personnel who are respon-
sible for creating the unsafe conditions that resulted in death, 
may greatly reduce the likelihood of the defendant reoffending. In 
the case of the convicted human, the causes of the offense may be 
hidden deep within the human psyche and impervious to 
change—and therefore conviction and sanction may be unlikely to 
prevent reoffense. These observations shape the LRC’s recom-
mendations regarding sanctions for a corporate defendant.99 
Nevertheless, there should be some similarities to the sanc-
tions process for both human and corporate defendants. Perhaps 
most importantly, the LRC recommends a pre-sentence report in 
both cases.100 This will help the judge in sentencing and, in the 
case of an appeal, provide a transparent basis for assessing such 
matters as the amount of the fine. 
B. Sanctions 
1. Fines 
The LRC recommends that unlimited fines be available to 
punish corporate defendants convicted of manslaughter.101 It 
notes several criticisms regarding the use of fines.102 First, fines 
can create the public impression that corporations can “buy their 
way out” of corporate manslaughter offenses.103 Attempts to avoid 
this problem, however, can lead to another problem known as a 
“deterrence trap,” in which the only fine sufficient to impose suffi-
cient deterrence may be so large that a corporate defendant 
cannot pay it.104 On the other hand, a number of corporate de-
  
 98. Id. at 79. 
 99. Id. at 79–80. 
 100. Id. at 80.  
 101. Id. at 82. 
 102. Id. at 81. 
 103. L. Reform Comm’n, supra n. 7, at 18.  
 104. L. Reform Comm’n, supra n. 2, at 81 (citing Paul C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: 
No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 
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fendants are non-commercial bodies.105 Imposing a large fine on a 
public-sector body will have a far different effect than a similar 
fine on a for-profit organization.106 
There is also the question of properly calibrating the amount 
of the fine. The LRC recommends against aligning the amount of 
the fine with turnover (as is the case with certain antitrust fines) 
because this might underpenalize corporations that are asset-rich 
but have comparatively low turnovers.107  
Nevertheless, the LRC “recommends that a court sentencing 
[a corporation] convicted of corporate manslaughter should have 
the power to impose an unlimited fine.”108  
2. Remedial Orders 
In addition to the use of fines as a means of disciplining cor-
porations found guilty of corporate manslaughter, the LRC also 
explains the potential value in the use of remedial orders: 
Remedial orders can potentially be excellent rehabilitative 
tools; by examining where the corporation went wrong, a 
remedial order can require the [corporation] to take the nec-
essary steps to remedy the problem . . . [T]he conditions 
imposed could require the undertaking to conduct an inter-
nal investigation into the circumstances of the occurrence of 
the corporate killing offen[s]e, followed by appropriate inter-
nal disciplinary proceedings, and the filing of a satisfactory 
compliance report with the court.109 
For these reasons, the LRC “recommends that a court sen-
tencing an undertaking for corporate manslaughter should have 
the option of imposing a remedial order.”110 
  
Mich. L. Rev. 386, 390 (1981)). 
 105. Id. at 82. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 81. 
 108. Id. at 82. 
 109. Id. at 83. 
 110. Id. at 84. 
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3. Community Service Orders 
The LRC, on balance, recommends that community service 
orders be available to the sentencing court imposing a sanction 
against a company convicted of corporate manslaughter.111 The 
LRC, however, does recognize several drawbacks to this sentenc-
ing approach, and suggests certain methods of mitigating these 
drawbacks. First, because the community service will be per-
formed by employees paid by the corporation, it may again appear 
that the company is buying its way out of a conviction—and with 
the use of forced labor.112 Second, there is the possibility that the 
community service will be directed to the court’s pet charity, or 
used as an alternative to the expenditure of government resources 
on matters for which the government should rightly pay.113 
The LRC would get around these difficulties by adopting an 
approach recommended by the LRC of Australia: 
(i) Community service orders should be available at the 
discretion of the court; 
(ii) If, after finding that a corporation has contravened 
the Act, the court decides that a community service 
order would be the appropriate penalty option . . . it 
should indicate this to the corporation and ask it to 
prepare a report on a community service project it 
could perform in lieu of, or in addition to, a monetary 
penalty; 
(iii) If the contravener does not propose a project, or the 
court rejects its proposal, the court should specify the 
project to be undertaken or impose a different type of 
penalty; 
(iv) Community service projects should be required to 
bear a reasonable relationship to the contravention. 
This requirement is necessary to prevent community 
service orders being used to promote ‘pet charities.’ In 
determining the nature of a community service the 
court should be required to consider what, if any, 
damage was suffered by the community as a whole as 
  
 111. Id. at 91. 
 112. Id. at 89. 
 113. Id. 
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a result of the contravention, and to require a reason-
able relationship between the community service 
project and the nature of the damage; 
(v) If more supervision is required than could be per-
formed by the court, the court should appoint a 
person to be an independent representative of the 
court. This representative could, for example, be a 
lawyer, accountant, auditor, receiver or other appro-
priately qualified person. He or she would supervise 
compliance with the project and, if necessary, prepare 
reports on a proposed project. The fees of such a per-
son would be payable by the contravener.114 
4. Adverse Publicity Orders 
An adverse publicity order would serve several useful func-
tions according to the LRC.115 Such a response would not only 
counteract the perception that a company was buying its way out 
of an offense by paying a fine, but also would express public dis-
approval of the offense in a way that a simple fine or remedial 
order might not.116 An adverse publicity order: 
[W]ould require the convicted undertaking to publici[z]e the 
fact of a conviction for corporate manslaughter at its own 
expense; the undertaking might be required to write to 
shareholders and/or customers or it might be required to 
place an advertisement in a local or national newspaper. The 
precise content of such publicity would be set by the court.117 
  
 114. Id. at 90–91 (quoting L. Reform Comm’n, supra n. 7, at 199–200 (2003) (available 
at http://www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/consultation%20papers/cpCorporate%20Killing 
.pdf)). 
 115. Id. at 91–93. 
 116. Id. at 91–92 
 117. Id. at 91. 
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5. Restraining Orders/Injunctions 
The LRC believes that the existing Irish law regarding re-
straining orders and injunctions is adequate for the range of 
sanctions it is imposing and does not recommend a change.118 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The LRC has recommended various changes in the law to re-
duce or eliminate uncertainties in Irish law regarding corporate 
manslaughter.119 These recommendations contain valuable in-
sights for the American legal debate on corporate criminal 
liability. First, there is the issue of whether a more legislatively 
based approach would be suitable in the United States, particu-
larly given the debate over the initial legitimacy of the common 
law basis for corporate criminal liability. A legislative approach 
might address some of the uncertainties arising due to the com-
mon law origins of the doctrine in the United States. 
The proposed approach by the LRC also highlights the issue 
of the proper sanctions to be imposed upon a corporate defendant. 
The focus on sanctions “de-centers” two of the principal issues in 
the American debate: (1) the ethical soundness of imposing crimi-
nal liability on a corporation due to spillover effects on arguably 
“innocent” parties; and (2) the effectiveness of criminal sanc-
tions—particularly fines—that may be passed on to the customers 
of the corporation. 
By following the Irish debate and the subsequent introduc-
tion of legislation criminalizing corporate killing, American legal 
observers may gain fresh insights to inform the ongoing debate 
within the United States. 
 
  
 118. Id. at 94. 
 119. See generally id. (listing a multitude of findings and recommendations for the 
treatment of corporations found guilty of committing corporate manslaughter in Ireland). 
